Why Does the American Form of Government Work?

"The effect of the [delegation of government] is, on the one hand, to refine and enlarge the public views, by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country, and whose patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations. Under such a regulation, it may well happen that the public voice, pronounced by the representatives of the people, will be more consonant to the public good than if pronounced by the people themselves, convened for the purpose."

"The other point of difference is, the greater number of citizens and extent of territory which may be brought within the compass of republican than of democratic government... Extend the sphere, and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it to discover their own strength, and to act in unison with each other."

In Federalist Paper No. 10, Madison argues that factions, created by inherent differences in opinion, have been the most dangerous culminations toward direct democracies, as the will of the majority can be persuaded into unjust actions. Madison finds the solution to maligned factions through a republic, where representatives are chosen by the people to govern. He drives two main arguments to support this. In the first passage, he says that delegating government to representatives "refines and enlarges the public views," as these representatives "may best discern the true interest of their country," and will thus take actions that are better "to the public good than if pronounced by the people themselves." In essence, representatives can voice the public opinion while keeping check more malicious factions – they filter public views through wisdom. The second passage argues that republics also can extend the sphere of democracy. Whereas in direct democracies, larger societies cannot function, Madison says that "the greater number of citizens... may be brought within the compass of republican" governments, as the governing body is much smaller than that of the actual population. More importantly, the argument is made that by extending democracy, majorities have less common motive – when the public is millions of people large, malicious intent will have a smaller impact, as "it will be more difficult for all who feel [a common motive]... to act in unison..."

"In order to lay a due foundation for that separate and distinct exercise of the different powers of government... it is evident that each department should have a will of its own; and consequently should be so constituted that the members of each should have as little agency as possible in the appointment of the members of the others... A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions.

"In the extended republic of the United States, and among the great variety of interests, parties, and sects which it embraces, a coalition of a majority of the whole society could seldom take place on any other principles than those of justice and the general good; whilst there being thus less danger to a minor from the will of a major party, there must be less pretext, also, to provide for the security of the former, by introducing into the government a will not dependent on the latter, or, in other words, a will independent of the society itself."

In Federalist Paper No. 51, Madison introduces the idea of check and balances. While the government's power should purely be derived from the people, checks are necessary within the government to make sure it functions properly. This form of republican government works to fight against the power of the majority, as in an extended republic, he argues, the majorities themselves will be too sectional and fractured to agree on anything besides general principles of good. The first passage labels the thesis – the government needs to maintain control over its own functions through the "separate and distinct exercise" of its different forms. These separate branches should hold check over each other and should each "have a will of its own." While the government serves to be "a dependence on the people," balances within government, Madison argues, are necessary precautions. The second passage follows the theme laid in the Federalist Papers No. 10. To check against majority will, Madison argues that in extended republics majorities will have no collective common interest but that "of justice and general good." He also floats the idea of "a will independent of the society itself," or a will that is purely the governments as a method to make sure minorities' rights are respected.