Why does the American form of government work?

#10
"If a faction consists of less than a majority, relief is supplied by the republican principle, which enables the majority to defeat its sinister views by regular vote. It may clog the administration, it may convulse the society; but it will be unable to execute and mask its violence under the forms of the Constitution. When a majority is included in a faction, the form of popular government, on the other hand, enables it to sacrifice to its ruling passion or interest both the public good and the rights of other citizens. To secure the public good and private rights against the danger of such a faction, and at the same time to preserve the spirit and the form of popular government, is then the great object to which our inquiries are directed. Let me add that it is the great desideratum by which this form of government can be rescued from the opprobrium under which it has so long labored, and be recommended to the esteem and adoption of mankind." 

"In the next place, as each representative will be chosen by a greater number of citizens in the large than in the small republic, it will be more difficult for unworthy candidates to practice with success the vicious arts by which elections are too often carried; and the suffrages of the people being more free, will be more likely to centre in men who possess the most attractive merit and the most diffusive and established characters."

Madison asserts that this system of government would do better than a pure democracy because the majority cannot tyrannize the minority. He addresses people's fear of such a large republic not being able to succeed by saying that there is less of a chance of an unsatisfactory and incapable leader rising to power because there will be a greater amount of people to vote for the selection of candidates. In the second quote, he reiterates this point by saying that it is better to be a larger republic because it would be harder for candidates to cheat their way through elections, and the people would be able to vote for the perosn they believe is best and most qualified for the position.

#51
"In order to lay a due foundation for that separate and distinct exercise of the different powers of government, which to a certain extent is admitted on all hands to be essential to the preservation of liberty, it is evident that each department should have a will of its own; and consequently should be so constituted that the members of each should have as little agency as possible in the appointment of the members of the others. Were this principle rigorously adhered to, it would require that all the appointments for the supreme executive, legislative, and judiciary magistracies should be drawn from the same fountain of authority, the people, through channels having no communication whatever with one another. Perhaps such a plan of constructing the several departments would be less difficult in practice than it may in contemplation appear. Some difficulties, however, and some additional expense would attend the execution of it. Some deviations, therefore, from the principle must be admitted. In the constitution of the judiciary department in particular, it might be inexpedient to insist rigorously on the principle: first, because peculiar qualifications being essential in the members, the primary consideration ought to be to select that mode of choice which best secures these qualifications; secondly, because the permanent tenure by which the appointments are held in that department, must soon destroy all sense of dependence on the authority conferring them."

Here, Madison declares that the different branches of government cannot have any communication between each other whatsoever, so that they may not plot together and come to an agreement with each other. He then says that each department should have as little influence in the hiring of other members and that each department's appointments should only be done through one authority, the people, which gives control to the people, and the government becomes a device to serve the people and not the other way it around. It also lessens the ability of the government to exploit the people. Madison concedes that some things, like the appointment of judges needs a little more consideration of qualifications, but still, they must be able to become independent of the authority that placed them in their position to be able to serve the people best.

"But the great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same department, consists in giving to those who administer each department the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others. The provision for defense must in this, as in all other cases, be made commensurate to the danger of attack. Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. The interest of the man must be connected with the constitutional rights of the place. It may be a reflection on human nature, that such devices should be necessary to control the abuses of government. But what is government itself, but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself. A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions."

In this section of the Madison's essay, he explains how checks and balances in a government is necessary. By making sure that no department of government can gain too much power, the people have more security because they understand that their government will not be able to become an overbearing monarchy or dictatorship. Madison says that it is human nature to do bad things, which is why the government should be set up as a defense against attack. He specifically says that "if men were angels, no government would be necessary." This cautious approach guarantees more safety than in other governments to the people against obvious moves to control government.