Lusitania: Conspiracy or Negligence?

On Friday, May 7 1915, a German U-boat U-20 commanded by Walther Schwieger torpedoed the RMS Lusitania, killing 1,198 on board. Although the US did not declare war until two years later, the event played a major factor in turning US public opinion against Germany. Yet underneath the simple catastrophe lies layers of conspiracy and secrecy surrounding the truth of the sinking. Historians look both to the inaction of the British Admiralty in protecting the Lusitania, especially in light of the following passage from a letter from Churchill to president of Britain’s Board of Trade Walter Runciman:

“It is most important to attract neutral shipping to our shores in the hope especially of embroiling the United States with Germany . . . . For our part we want the traffic — the more the better; and if some of it gets into trouble, better still.”

While the Lusitania was a British ship and not “neutral shipping,” Churchill’s argument can still be applied to the sinking — 128 Americans drowned in the incident.

Furthermore, Room 40, the office of British Naval Intelligence during World War I, had captured German codes and did have understanding of Schwieger’s location throughout the incident. Despite this knowledge, the Admiralty did nothing. Previous shipping lines sailing in the same area had received escort ships or had been diverted from the path. Captain Turner of the Lusitania, however, had received no such help despite Room 40’s knowledge of the lurking U-20 boat. Radio exchanges from Lusitania and other possible evidence remains classified today.

According to naval historian Patrick Beesly, the incident either derives from failure or from conspiracy. Based on the accounts of Room 40, he said, “I would prefer to attribute this failure to negligence, even gross negligence, rather [than] to a conspiracy deliberately to endanger the ship."

Yet he could not find a more likely conclusion besides conspiracy, and then said, “On the basis of the considerable volume of information which is now available, I am reluctantly compelled to state on balance, the most likely explanation is that there was indeed a plot, however imperfect, to endanger the Lusitania in order to involve the United States in the war.”

The legal inquiries following the incident proved unfruitful, and perhaps deliberately so. Initially, the Admiralty sought to blame Captain Turner, who had survived, for the sinking. They argued Turner positioned the ship too close to the coast. US admirals agreed, given the basics of what had occurred. However, they remarked on how little detail was provided by the inquiry. US Consul Frost said, “Bare facts only. No instructions or interpretation. It is true that Turner should have kept farther out; but to my mind it seemed that the Admiralty had by no means done their full duty to him.”

While the Admiralty possibly could have garnered more sympathy from America in blaming the Germans, historian Erik Larson wrote in his book Dead Wake on the sinking, “By blaming Turner… the Admiralty hoped to divert attention from its own failure to safeguard the Lusitania.” 

Larson then cited Churchill, who said, “Merchant traffic must look after itself.”

Later on, the Admiralty did place full blame on the German U-20. Yet the inquiry failed to answer for the actions of the Admiralty itself, and the question of why Room 40 refused to provide the Lusitania any escort amidst dangerous waters still remains.

Churchill’s answer? “It might [have helped],” he said. “But…the submarine would have probably torpedoed both of us.”