Federalist Essays #10:
"If a faction consists of less than a majority, relief is supplied by the republican principle, which enables the majority to defeat its sinister views by regular vote. It may clog the administration, it may convulse the society; but it will be unable to execute and mask its violence under the forms of the Constitution. When a majority is included in a faction, the form of popular government, on the other hand, enables it to sacrifice to its ruling passion or interest both the public good and the rights of other citizens. To secure the public good and private rights against the danger of such a faction, and at the same time to preserve the spirit and the form of popular government, is then the great object to which our inquiries are directed."
"The smaller the society, the fewer probably will be the distinct parties and interests composing it; the fewer the distinct parties and interests, the more frequently will a majority be found of the same party; and the smaller the number of individuals composing a majority, and the smaller the compass within which they are placed, the more easily will they concert and execute their plans of oppression. Extend the sphere, and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it to discover their own strength, and to act in unison with each other. Besides other impediments, it may be remarked that, where there is a consciousness of unjust or dishonorable purposes, communication is always checked by distrust in proportion to the number whose concurrence is necessary."
In this paper, Madison identifies one of the largest threats facing a functioning government is preventing one party or one set of interests to entirely dominate the legislative or political decision making. This is important because if the government was controlled entirely by one group, they could pass policies to limit the rights of opposition party or other classes. He argues that the best way to accomplish this is to create a large republic, which would involve all the colonies joining together. His argument for this is that by having a society with more unique views, it makes a powerful majority less likely to form. One reason for this is that there are more nuanced differences in the policies of different groups. For example. if a majority of rich land owners comes to power, normally they could take action to hurt the liberties of the poor. However, it is possible that such a policy could not be passed over the entire country because of economic differences in the South and New England. The different goals of the regions prevents the policy from passing, even though a majority has formed. This is the argument Madison makes for why all 13 colonies must be part of a single republic.
Federal Essays #51
"In order to lay a due foundation for that separate and distinct exercise of the different powers of government, which to a certain extent is admitted on all hands to be essential to the preservation of liberty, it is evident that each department should have a will of its own; and consequently should be so constituted that the members of each should have as little agency as possible in the appointment of the members of the others. Were this principle rigorously adhered to, it would require that all the appointments for the supreme executive, legislative, and judiciary magistracies should be drawn from the same fountain of authority, the people, through channels having no communication whatever with one another. Perhaps such a plan of constructing the several departments would be less difficult in practice than it may in contemplation appear. Some difficulties, however, and some additional expense would attend the execution of it. Some deviations, therefore, from the principle must be admitted. In the constitution of the judiciary department in particular, it might be inexpedient to insist rigorously on the principle: first, because peculiar qualifications being essential in the members, the primary consideration ought to be to select that mode of choice which best secures these qualifications; secondly, because the permanent tenure by which the appointments are held in that department, must soon destroy all sense of dependence on the authority conferring them."
"But the great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same department, consists in giving to those who administer each department the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others. The provision for defense must in this, as in all other cases, be made commensurate to the danger of attack. Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. The interest of the man must be connected with the constitutional rights of the place."
Federalist Essay #51 argues for a system of checks and balances to be placed on government, but also explains why the particular system laid out in the Constitution is the best way to do it. He concedes that an in an ideal world, every public official would derive their power from the people and only the people. However, that world does not function, both because it would be impossible to elect that many people, and sometimes qualifications are more important than where their power comes from, such as with judges. As a result, he instead argues that instead of less power over each other, the branches of government should have more power over each other. By each branch being able to check the advances of each of the others, no one branch is ever granted excess power or an overbearing role in government. Although it may seem contrary at first, the best way to prevent a branch of government from gaining power over another branch is to give all the branches power over each other to start with.
Friday, August 26, 2016
Why does the American form of government work?
No. 10:
"If a faction consists of less than a majority, relief is supplied by the republican principle, which enables the majority to defeat its sinister views by regular vote. . . . but it will be unable to execute and mask its violence under the forms of the Constitution. When a majority is included in a faction, the form of popular government, on the other hand, enables it to sacrifice to its ruling passion or interest both the public good and the rights of other citizens. To secure the public good and private rights against the danger of such a faction, and at the same time to preserve the spirit and the form of popular government, is then the great object to which our inquiries are directed."
In this quote, Madison describes how government reacts if a disruptive faction starts causing problems in society. He writes that as long as the majority of the people are not part of the bad faction, they can "defeat its sinister views by regular vote." He says that as long as the unruly faction is not comprised of the majority of the people, then the majority which will be comprised of the rest of the people can rise and pass legislation to stop that faction. Madison also brings up the downside of ruling with popular factions. They can become overly powerful and take power away from the minority factions. He says that point as to if the majority of the people are part of the unlawful faction. There, he says that it will be up to the rest of the people to sacrifice their passions in order to preserve the public good of the rest of the people. He says that to avoid that the people have to "preserve the spirit and the form of popular government", meaning that it will be up the the wholehearted goodness of the people to ensure a government will not fall into chaos.
"If a faction consists of less than a majority, relief is supplied by the republican principle, which enables the majority to defeat its sinister views by regular vote. . . . but it will be unable to execute and mask its violence under the forms of the Constitution. When a majority is included in a faction, the form of popular government, on the other hand, enables it to sacrifice to its ruling passion or interest both the public good and the rights of other citizens. To secure the public good and private rights against the danger of such a faction, and at the same time to preserve the spirit and the form of popular government, is then the great object to which our inquiries are directed."
In this quote, Madison describes how government reacts if a disruptive faction starts causing problems in society. He writes that as long as the majority of the people are not part of the bad faction, they can "defeat its sinister views by regular vote." He says that as long as the unruly faction is not comprised of the majority of the people, then the majority which will be comprised of the rest of the people can rise and pass legislation to stop that faction. Madison also brings up the downside of ruling with popular factions. They can become overly powerful and take power away from the minority factions. He says that point as to if the majority of the people are part of the unlawful faction. There, he says that it will be up to the rest of the people to sacrifice their passions in order to preserve the public good of the rest of the people. He says that to avoid that the people have to "preserve the spirit and the form of popular government", meaning that it will be up the the wholehearted goodness of the people to ensure a government will not fall into chaos.
No. 51:
"In a society under the forms of which the stronger faction can readily unite and oppress the weaker, anarchy may as truly be said to reign as in a state of nature, where the weaker individual is not secured against the violence of the stronger; and as, in the latter state, even the stronger individuals are prompted, by the uncertainty of their condition, to submit to a government which may protect the weak as well as themselves; so, in the former state, will the more powerful factions or parties be gradually induced, by a like motive, to wish for a government which will protect all parties, the weaker as well as the more powerful."
In this quote, Madison is saying that in order for a government to be successful and not overrun by corrupt people, there need to be "more powerful factions or parties be gradually introduced". What he is saying here is that with more factions vying for control, the flux of power will always be balanced between the various factions. As long as there is a good balance, no faction should be able to take overthrow the republic. This connects to Federalist Essays No. 10 because in both he discusses the issues of various factions. He talks about the need for the factions to be ruled by the popular government, and the fact that there needs to be multiple power factions in order to keep the balance not shifted in one way.
Federalist Paper #51
“But the great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same department, consists in giving to those who administer each department the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others.” This means for every department Legislative, Executive and Judicial should be independent. The election process mostly have to do with the people and the state and not the the other branches and that is Madison is pointing out. The only way out is judicial branch the people can not only pick the judicial branch they have also have to pick the Executive and Judicial. He says that the legislative is the strongest because the people say the power. That is why Madison says we need to give them life time jobs so they feeling of independence. As I said that the legislation is the most powerful branch so they don’t want that branch to get so powerful so that power doesn’t get all that power to be turned against other people. This works because now the people are been heard and it’s not only the people with power been heard it everyone been heard.
“If men were angels, no government would be necessary.” What he is saying is that look we know that we are men we have faults. We are going to create a government but people might screw it up If everyone will agree that if we were all angels, no state would be necessary, and if angels was the governors , they would not require internal or external constraints to ensure that they governernment. People will try to always be better than others. They will hurt each other if it brings benefit to themselves. Angels are good because god sent them. People are bad because the “devil” are tempting to go outraged. What he is trying to say is that we want a government that will work and not fall and become another war. This works because he is putting himself in people’s shoes because the people always felt left out and not been into consideration. It also shows that when the government is not is not the best government the people don’t have to “sin”(go crazy). All the people have to do is bring their opinions to the government.
Why does the American form of government work?
Federalist Papers No. 10:
"No man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause, because his interest would certainly bias his judgment, and, not improbably, corrupt his integrity. With equal, nay with greater reason, a body of men are unfit to be both judges and parties at the same time; yet what are many of the most important acts of legislation, but so many judicial determinations, not indeed concerning the rights of single persons, but concerning the rights of large bodies of citizens? "
"In the extent and proper structure of the Union, therefore, we behold a republican remedy for the diseases most incident to republican government. And according to the degree of pleasure and pride we feel in being republicans, ought to be our zeal in cherishing the spirit and supporting the character of Federalists."
Federalist Paper No. 51:
"In order to lay a due foundation for that separate and distinct exercise of the different powers of government, which to a certain extent is admitted on all hands to be essential to the preservation of liberty, it is evident that each department should have a will of its own; and consequently should be so constituted that the members of each should have as little agency as possible in the appointment of the members of the others."
"A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions. This policy of supplying, by opposite and rival interests, the defect of better motives, might be traced through the whole system of human affairs, private as well as public. "
"No man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause, because his interest would certainly bias his judgment, and, not improbably, corrupt his integrity. With equal, nay with greater reason, a body of men are unfit to be both judges and parties at the same time; yet what are many of the most important acts of legislation, but so many judicial determinations, not indeed concerning the rights of single persons, but concerning the rights of large bodies of citizens? "
"In the extent and proper structure of the Union, therefore, we behold a republican remedy for the diseases most incident to republican government. And according to the degree of pleasure and pride we feel in being republicans, ought to be our zeal in cherishing the spirit and supporting the character of Federalists."
Federalist Paper No. 51:
"In order to lay a due foundation for that separate and distinct exercise of the different powers of government, which to a certain extent is admitted on all hands to be essential to the preservation of liberty, it is evident that each department should have a will of its own; and consequently should be so constituted that the members of each should have as little agency as possible in the appointment of the members of the others."
"A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions. This policy of supplying, by opposite and rival interests, the defect of better motives, might be traced through the whole system of human affairs, private as well as public. "
RESPONSE: Why does the American form of government work?
Based on the passages above, I would say that the American form of government works essentially because of the division of many separate branches concerning all forms of government that work with separate factions of commerce, etc. But the reason that this particularly WORKS, as shown in Federalist Paper 51, is that the members of their respective branches are able to be dependent on each other, but not TOO dependent, so that there's a balance of power between them. This balance of power is constantly "checked", and it is because of this that liberty is preserved, and the government works.
Based on the passages above, I would say that the American form of government works essentially because of the division of many separate branches concerning all forms of government that work with separate factions of commerce, etc. But the reason that this particularly WORKS, as shown in Federalist Paper 51, is that the members of their respective branches are able to be dependent on each other, but not TOO dependent, so that there's a balance of power between them. This balance of power is constantly "checked", and it is because of this that liberty is preserved, and the government works.
Why Does the American Form of Government Work?
"The effect of the [delegation of government] is, on the one hand, to refine and enlarge the public views, by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country, and whose patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations. Under such a regulation, it may well happen that the public voice, pronounced by the representatives of the people, will be more consonant to the public good than if pronounced by the people themselves, convened for the purpose."
"The other point of difference is, the greater number of citizens and extent of territory which may be brought within the compass of republican than of democratic government... Extend the sphere, and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it to discover their own strength, and to act in unison with each other."
In Federalist Paper No. 10, Madison argues that factions, created by inherent differences in opinion, have been the most dangerous culminations toward direct democracies, as the will of the majority can be persuaded into unjust actions. Madison finds the solution to maligned factions through a republic, where representatives are chosen by the people to govern. He drives two main arguments to support this. In the first passage, he says that delegating government to representatives "refines and enlarges the public views," as these representatives "may best discern the true interest of their country," and will thus take actions that are better "to the public good than if pronounced by the people themselves." In essence, representatives can voice the public opinion while keeping check more malicious factions – they filter public views through wisdom. The second passage argues that republics also can extend the sphere of democracy. Whereas in direct democracies, larger societies cannot function, Madison says that "the greater number of citizens... may be brought within the compass of republican" governments, as the governing body is much smaller than that of the actual population. More importantly, the argument is made that by extending democracy, majorities have less common motive – when the public is millions of people large, malicious intent will have a smaller impact, as "it will be more difficult for all who feel [a common motive]... to act in unison..."
"In order to lay a due foundation for that separate and distinct exercise of the different powers of government... it is evident that each department should have a will of its own; and consequently should be so constituted that the members of each should have as little agency as possible in the appointment of the members of the others... A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions.
"In the extended republic of the United States, and among the great variety of interests, parties, and sects which it embraces, a coalition of a majority of the whole society could seldom take place on any other principles than those of justice and the general good; whilst there being thus less danger to a minor from the will of a major party, there must be less pretext, also, to provide for the security of the former, by introducing into the government a will not dependent on the latter, or, in other words, a will independent of the society itself."
In Federalist Paper No. 51, Madison introduces the idea of check and balances. While the government's power should purely be derived from the people, checks are necessary within the government to make sure it functions properly. This form of republican government works to fight against the power of the majority, as in an extended republic, he argues, the majorities themselves will be too sectional and fractured to agree on anything besides general principles of good. The first passage labels the thesis – the government needs to maintain control over its own functions through the "separate and distinct exercise" of its different forms. These separate branches should hold check over each other and should each "have a will of its own." While the government serves to be "a dependence on the people," balances within government, Madison argues, are necessary precautions. The second passage follows the theme laid in the Federalist Papers No. 10. To check against majority will, Madison argues that in extended republics majorities will have no collective common interest but that "of justice and general good." He also floats the idea of "a will independent of the society itself," or a will that is purely the governments as a method to make sure minorities' rights are respected.
Why Does the American Form of Government Work?
The Federalist #10
The Federalist #10
"From this view of the subject it may be concluded that a pure democracy, by which I mean a society consisting of a small number of citizens, who assemble and administer the government in person, can admit of no cure for the mischiefs of faction."
In this quote, James Madison concludes that a pure democracy, which he views as total equality for everyone, would be unable to counter powerful and corrupt groups. Therefore, he argues, it a democratic republic is the most effective form of government, because the elected few are intelligent and righteous enough to limit the influence of factions. Madison's point of view here gives great insight into why the United States' government has functioned successfully for so long. As referenced in the article, there have been many instances of failed democracy, which has come from corruption induced by large factions. In the U.S, such factions exist, but the elected representatives are elite members of society, and are much less likely to allow outside interest groups to influence them.
"The influence of factious leaders may kindle a flame within their particular States, but will be unable to spread a general conflagration through the other States."
Here, James Madison says that states will be vulnerable to the influence of factions. However, Madison argues that because of the democratic republic system, this influence would be unable to spread throughout the nation. Madison's idea about states once again shows the American desire for democracy, as well as its lack of naivety regarding the subject. States are run very democratically, with each citizen's vote counting towards the final outcome, which Madison understands to be very dangerous in terms of the vulnerability towards corrupt groups. However, on any occasion where an elected representative is in the pocket of a faction, other elected representatives would nullify his power.
The Federalist #51
"But the great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same department, consists in giving to those who administer each department the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others."
James Madison's main point in the beginning of this article discusses the relationship between the three branches of government. In the quote above, James Madison each one as a way to curb each other's power so as to avoid all the power being placed in one way of thinking. Therefore, Madison argues that it is necessary to keep all three branches independent, so all three branches do not end up with the same opinions and biases. This shows the effectiveness of the American system compared to democracies of the past, where people or groups with special interests had easy access to power.
"There are but two methods of providing against this evil: the one by creating a will in the community independent of the majority -- that is, of the society itself; the other, by comprehending in the society so many separate descriptions of citizens as will render an unjust combination of a majority of the whole very improbable, if not impracticable.
In this passage, James Madison argues that democracies would normally give too much power to the majority. Madison believes that this is a problem because it would mean the government ignores the needs of minority. Therefore, he suggests creating separate descriptions of citizens so as to divide society up, and make a majority very difficult to achieve. This valuation of the minority also represents a facet of American government that is integral to its success. By making sure the minorities are fairly represented, government officials cannot only appeal to a majority.
Why does the American form of government work? Federalist essay 51
"There are but two methods of providing against this evil: the one by creating a will in the community independent of the majority that is, of the society itself; the other, by comprehending in the society so many separate descriptions of citizens as will render an unjust combination of a majority of the whole very improbable, if not impracticable. The first method prevails in all governments possessing an hereditary or self-appointed authority. This, at best, is but a precarious security; because a power independent of the society may as well espouse the unjust views of the major, as the rightful interests of the minor party, and may possibly be turned against both parties. The second method will be exemplified in the federal republic of the United States. Whilst all authority in it will be derived from and dependent on the society, the society itself will be broken into so many parts, interests, and classes of citizens, that the rights of individuals, or of the minority, will be in little danger from interested combinations of the majority." Federalist Paper 51
This section of the 51st Federalist Paper written by James Madison, exemplify another way in which the American form of government has worked so well, by a balance of power between the different legislatures and making the people and government dependent of each other. By imposing these balances on the different branches and by making sure that they are separate and do not rely on one another it allows the minority interests to still come forth. Because the government and people are dependent on one another an interesting balance of power is created. Government officials are elected by the people, so in order to keep their positions or gain positions in the government, they must hold the interests and values of the people they represent as a great priority. The people will choose an official who they think best represents their values and needs and the popular opinion or candidate are more likely to prevail. But because there are so many different sections and people involved in the choices that are ultimately made by the government, minority opinions and interests are still represented, ensuring that the minority is not completely overwhelmed by the majority. These balances and interdependence of the government and people is what has kept the American form of government working for so long. So long as the people are happy or at least justly represented, the government will be supported and function.
This section of the 51st Federalist Paper written by James Madison, exemplify another way in which the American form of government has worked so well, by a balance of power between the different legislatures and making the people and government dependent of each other. By imposing these balances on the different branches and by making sure that they are separate and do not rely on one another it allows the minority interests to still come forth. Because the government and people are dependent on one another an interesting balance of power is created. Government officials are elected by the people, so in order to keep their positions or gain positions in the government, they must hold the interests and values of the people they represent as a great priority. The people will choose an official who they think best represents their values and needs and the popular opinion or candidate are more likely to prevail. But because there are so many different sections and people involved in the choices that are ultimately made by the government, minority opinions and interests are still represented, ensuring that the minority is not completely overwhelmed by the majority. These balances and interdependence of the government and people is what has kept the American form of government working for so long. So long as the people are happy or at least justly represented, the government will be supported and function.
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