The Suez Canal: Tensions, Nationalization, and US Intervention

The Suez Crisis (AKA the Tripartite Aggression in the Arab world, or the Kadesh Operation or Sinai War in Israel) was a short conflict in 1956 lasting just nine days. The tensions in the region rose in July of 1956 following Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser's nationalization of the Suez canal. Previously, under the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936, the canal was administered by the UK. The nationalization of the canal came about due to quite peculiar consequences.

Gamal Abdel Nasser (1918-1970)

The Egyptian revolution of 1952 (AKA the July 23 revolution) overthrew the Egyptian monarchy and ended British occupation of the country. In the midst of the Cold War, the question arose of which side Nasser would ally with. Portraying himself as a pan-Arab neutralist leader, the US saw Nasser as a possible leader of a capitalist Arab coalition that would reduce Soviet influence in the region. Following an attack on Egyptian soldiers by Israel near the border, Nasser felt the need to demonstrate his ability to defend Egypt in order to protect his credibility and influence in the region. Seeking to modernize his military, Nasser requested US aid. President Eisenhower offered Nasser weapons, but on the strict terms that American military personnel would supervise their use and training. Nasser rejected these terms, and instead turned to the USSR, signing an arms deal with Czechoslovakia (the middleman) in September of 1955.

The High Aswan Dam

Still seeking to restrict communist influence in the Middle East (which would later become known as the Eisenhower Doctrine), the US, along with the UK, offered to pledge money for the construction of the High Aswan Dam. This dam would provide flood regulation, hydroelectricity, and irrigation capabilities, which would allow for Egypt to continue its industrialization process. American diplomats saw Nasser attempting to play them against the Soviets for financing of the dam, and withdrew funding offers in early 1956. At the time, the NSC claimed,"If they [the Soviets] do make this offer we can make a lot of use of it in propaganda within the satellite bloc. 'You don't get bread because you are being squeezed to build a dam.'" Despite this push, Allen Dulles, director of the CIA, saw to remove the US from the Dam's funding, as to avoid the impression that Nasser had bargained between the two superpowers.

Finally, Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal on July 26. Israel, Great Britain, and France soon launched an invasion of Egypt in order to regain control of the canal. The operation was successful despite some delays, but the Eisenhower administration took a moderate approach. Not wanting an escalation to war with the USSR (which had been supplying Egypt with arms through Czechoslovakia). Eisenhower urged Khrushchev to refrain from intervening and threatened to impose sanctions on Israel, the UK, and France if they were not to retreat. The UK and France retreated almost immediately, just nine short days after the first invasion. Israel occupied the Sinai peninsula until March, at which time it retreated.

Militarily, the coalition powers had been successful, and the US had succeeded in preventing an escalation with the Soviet Union. Despite this, the long-term consequences were not in the United States' favor. The retreat had strengthened Egyptian influence in the region, and solidified its ties to the Soviet Union. Despite being a founding member of the non-aligned movement, Nasser's Egypt continued to receive military support from the Soviet Union, which became significant in subsequent wars between Israel and the Arab world. For example, in 1970, Soviet pilots were pitted directly against Israeli pilots during the War of Attrition, during operation Rimon 20. Ultimately, the Suez Crisis constituted an important demonstration of the influence of the US and USSR in the Middle East, and created a climate between Israel, Arab powers, and the two major superpowers that would last for almost three decades.

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http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/gamal-abdel-nasser
https://www.jstor.org/stable/4283762
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https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/2/2e/BarragemAssu%C3%A3o.jpg