Nondelegation Doctrine

     The nondelegation doctrine is the theory that no branch of the government can authorize another entity to exercise the powers that it itself is authorized to exercise. The theory is integral to maintaining a strict separation of powers, and is either implicitly or explicitly in all constitutions that impose such a structure. In the United States the theory is frequently applied to the Federal government, especially Congress, who through Article I of the Constitution are vested with all federal legislative power.  The clause says "All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives". Similar clauses are also found in Article II and III, which vest executive and judicial power to the President and federal judiciary, respectively. These three articles allow each branch to exercise only its own powers, essential to establishing a limited government. However, the limits of nondelegation have often been contested, especially during the 1930s when Congress provided the president with a wide range of powers to combat the Great Depression. This is reflected in the Supreme Court cases of the time.


Cases

Wayman v. Southard (1825)
This case was one of the earliest cases involving the exact limits of nondelegation. Prior to the case, Congress had given the courts the power to prescribe judicial procedure (due process), and it was argued that by doing this Congress had unconstitutionally given the courts ability to legislate. In the end, the Supreme Court ruled that although prescribing judicial procedure was a legislative function, there was a difference between important subjects and "mere details." The Chief Justice at the time, John Marshall, concluded that "a general provision may be made, and power given to those who are to act under such general provisions, to fill up the details."Ultimately, no concrete limits were set, allowing for future conflicts over those limits.

Panama Refining v. Ryan (1935)
This case, also known as the Hot Oil case, was the first of several cases concerning the constitutionality of Roosevelt's New Deal. This case focused on the Administration's ability to prohibit interstate and foreign trade in petroleum goods produced in excess of state quotes, as ordered under the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) or 1933. The court's ruling found the ability to be an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power, because it allowed the president to interfere with trade, normally a legislative power, without creating clear guidelines as to the application of that power, giving the president enormous and unchecked powers. As a result of the decision, the section of the NIRA that gave the President authority "to prohibit the transportation in interstate and foreign commerce of petroleum... produced or withdrawn from storage in excess of the amount permitted... by any State law" was struck down. The section was later relegislated as the Connally Hot Oil Act of 1935, this time establishing procedural safeguards to the President's authority.

Schechter Poultry Corp v. United States (1935)
This case further invalidated the regulations set forth under the New Deal, arguing that many elements of the legislation were in violation of the constitutional separation of powers. The regulations being contested were created under the NIRA in 1933, and included price and wage fixing, as well as requirements regarding the sale of whole chickens including unhealthy ones. Also included were regulations defining maximum work hours and the right of unions to organize. Under the NIRA, local codes regarding trade could be written by private trade and industrial laws, and the President could then choose to give some codes the force of law. The Supreme Court opposed such federal interference in the local economy, resulting in Roosevelt's threat to tip the balance of the Court by appointing new judges. The Court unanimously invalidated the President's authority to issue codes of fair competition, arguing that it delegated legislative power to the executive branch unconstitutionally. Although a majority of the NIRA had already been invalidated due to other decisions, the Court still used this case as an opportunity to affirm constitutional limits on congressional power.